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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008: AN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE THEORY

JAMES R. HACKNEY, JR.*
Professor powell paints a sweeping account of the relationship between the
Enlightenment and law. I agree with the basic thrust of his argument, and I
applaud his ability to make connections between the broad scope of intellectual
history and developments in law.1 I have previously written about the
interconnection between philosophical ideals and the development of legaleconomic theory as it particularly relates to tort law theory.2 Through his
extension of these ideas into other areas of law, Professor powell illustrates
their wide implications.
As Professor powell highlights, one of the principal tenets of the
Enlightenment is the belief in rationality and the focus on the individual as the
emphasis of analysis.3 This individualistic ideal is the foundation of
neoclassical economics, which I have previously detailed.4 It is also the
foundation for modern finance theory, which ascended with neoclassical
economics and has a close relationship with it both theoretically and
institutionally.
Currently, given changes in scientific and philosophical views, these
Enlightenment ideals have begun to come under assault. We see this in
notions of uncertainty in quantum theory within science and in the
neopragmatist turn in philosophy.5 Care needs to be taken, however, with
regard to the implications of our post-Enlightenment times. The emergence of
post-Enlightenment perspectives does not signal the end of Enlightenment
* Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law. I wish to thank all of the Childress
Lecture participants, particularly john powell, for their stimulating insights that helped me shape
this paper. I also want to thank the Childress Lecture organizers for sponsoring the event. Two
of my colleagues at Northeastern, David Phillips and Dan Schaffer, provided valuable comments
on earlier drafts of this Article. I also benefited from very thoughtful comments from Daniel
Walkowitz at the Second Annual J.S. Intellectual History Conference.
1. See generally john a. powell & Stephen M. Menendian, Remaking Law: Moving Beyond
Enlightenment Jurisprudence, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1035 (2010).
2. JAMES R. HACKNEY, JR., UNDER COVER OF SCIENCE: AMERICAN LEGAL-ECONOMIC
THEORY AND THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY (2007).
3. ROY PORTER, THE ENLIGHTENMENT 2–3 (2d ed. 2001).
4. HACKNEY, supra note 2, at 145.
5. Id. at 121–28.
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influences as a descriptive matter, nor should it, at least in my opinion, as a
normative matter. Enlightenment ideals are and should play an important role
in our quest for knowledge acquisition even in a post-Enlightenment world. I
believe that it is better to state the role of the relationship between
Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment ideas as being in a metaphorical
conversation with each other. Enlightenment thought does and should play a
continuing role in our quest for knowledge. Yet given the insights that we
have developed since the Enlightenment, we must augment, and at times
reconsider, forms of knowledge associated with the Enlightenment (including
rationality). Ironically, Enlightenment ideals may put us in the best position to
undertake this reevaluation given the Enlightenment’s emphasis on
empiricism.6 Modern finance theory provides a notable exemplar of my thesis
regarding the Enlightenment and its relationship to the post-Enlightenment era.
Further, these musings about finance theory, the Enlightenment, and postEnlightenment thinking are not merely an academic exercise because finance
theory has impacted world economies in profound ways—including the 2008
financial crisis.
Modern portfolio theory is the foundation upon which the edifice of
corporate finance theory has been erected.7 The theory posits that a rational
investor will invest in a diversified portfolio of securities—the mix of which
will depend upon his or her tolerance for risk.8 There are many technical
nuances associated with modern portfolio theory beyond the scope of this
Article.9 It is telling, however, that Harry Markowitz, the originator of
portfolio theory and widely regarded as the founder of modern corporate
finance theory, in a discussion with budding finance students emphasized that
they not only focus on the technical aspects of finance theory, but also consider
philosophical issues.10 Markowitz specifically referenced Rene Descartes’
First Meditation,11 David Hume’s An Inquiry Concerning Human
Understanding12 (“Human Understanding”), and Leonard Savage’s The

6. powell & Menendian, supra note 1, at 1041 (describing the empirical hallmark of the
Enlightenment).
7. Much of my description of corporate finance theory is derived from a more technical
description in STEPHEN A. ROSS, RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD & JEFFREY JAFFE, CORPORATE
FINANCE THEORY 261–87 (7th ed. 2005).
8. HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF
INVESTMENTS 6 (2d ed. 1991).
9. Id. at 37.
10. Interview by Steve Buser with Hennry M. Markowitz at Rady School of Management at
the University of California, San Diego (October 8, 2004) [hereinafter Markowitz Interview].
11. RENE DESCARTES, First Meditation, in DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND MEDITATIONS 95–
101 (Penguin Classic 1998) (1641).
12. DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 23 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2007) (1748).
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Foundations of Statistics.13 Each of these works exemplifies Enlightenment
ideals in their own way.
The First Meditation sets up Descartes’ starting point for philosophical
analysis. He is very skeptical about his ability to know through the senses.14
Descartes appreciates the physical sciences (e.g., physics, astronomy, and
medicine), but he is particularly attracted to the axiomatic sciences (e.g.,
arithmetic and geometry).15 Descartes’s devotion to the idea of scientific
discovery and the power of science may have been most important to
Markowitz, though. The First Meditation is infused with an ethos that science
holds the key to knowledge acquisition.16 This fixation with science is very
much a hallmark of the Enlightenment, and it is evident in Markowitz’s work
and throughout the rest of corporate finance theory.
David Hume is a central figure of the Enlightenment, and a key component
of Hume’s thought is his emphasis on empiricism. In his Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding, Hume adopted a skeptical position regarding human
knowledge acquisition and drew a distinction between demonstrative (logical)
and probable (empirical) reasoning.17 Probable reason according to Hume is,
by its very nature, uncertain, and it must be guided by both experience and
from our inference from evidence (which Hume referred to as “custom”).18 In
his treatise, Hume put forth the philosophical basis for probability theory—the
mathematical method of deriving inferences from experience.19 This method
would later serve as the foundation for contemporary statistics.20
According to Markowitz, Leonard Savage (who was Markowitz’s statistics
professor at the University of Chicago) taught him that “a rational agent acting
under uncertainty would act according to ‘probability beliefs’ where no
objective probabilities are known.”21 This is indeed the lesson one would draw
from Savage’s classic, The Foundations of Statistics.22 Savage takes the
foundation of statistics to be probability.23 His theory is part of a movement
that departs from the sort of historical intuitivism that focused on gathering and

13. LEONARD SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (Dover Publications 1972)
(1954).
14. DESCARTES, supra note 11, at 96.
15. Id. at 98.
16. See id. at 95–101.
17. HUME, supra note 12, at 25–26.
18. Id. at 32.
19. Id. at 32–34.
20. J. Durbin, Statistics and Statistical Science, 140 J. ROV. STATIST. SOC., A 177, 185
(1987).
21. Harry M. Markowitz, Foundations of Portfolio Theory, Nobel Lecture, (December 7,
1990), in ECONOMIC SCIENCES 280 (World Sci. Pub. 1992).
22. SAVAGE, supra note 13.
23. Id.
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condensing data, by replacing it with an emphasis on statistical inference
through mathematical techniques and logical reasoning.24 Savage frames this
as being based on a “personalistic” view of probability, which he defines quite
succinctly as follows:
Personalistic views hold that probability measures the confidence that a
particular individual has in the truth of a particular proposition, for example,
the proposition that it will rain tomorrow. These views postulate that the
25
individual concerned is in some ways ‘reasonable,’ . . . .

The reason that this probabilistic approach is necessary is that individuals must
make decisions under uncertainty.26 Savage builds up a “highly idealized
theory of the behavior of a ‘rational’ person with respect to decisions.”27 This
is precisely the form of theory that underpins Markowitz’s portfolio theory.
In Portfolio Selection,28 Markowitz articulates the following premises:
First, uncertainty with regard to risk is the salient feature in thinking about how
individuals make investment decisions.29 Second, the investor is assumed to
behave as the rational man would.30 The rational man is perfect in the sense
that he has access to all available information, makes no error in calculations,
and has no biases.31 But he is not omniscient.32 If the rational man were all
knowing, then the requirement of the first criterion, uncertainty, would not
hold. Finally, the investor is risk averse.33 He would prefer greater returns but
less risk (uncertainty).34
While portfolio theory is based on relatively sophisticated mathematics,
the basic intuition is quite simple. Assume that an individual is looking for
opportunities to invest. She could invest in a single asset, i.e., Company A
stock. Portfolio theory demonstrates that the investor would necessarily be
better off investing in a portfolio of securities.35 If she invests in both
Company A stock and Company B stock, she will be able to reduce her risk for

24. Id. at 2.
25. Id. at 3.
26. Id. at 6.
27. SAVAGE, supra note 13, at 7.
28. HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION 205–07 (2d ed. Basil Blackwell 1991)
(1959) [hereinafter MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION] (a monograph length treatment of the
path breaking ideas Markowitz had put forward in 1952 regarding portfolio selection); Harry M.
Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 77–91 (1952).
29. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION, supra note 28, at 206.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 6.
34. Stephen B. Cohen, The Suitability Rule and Economic Theory, 80 YALE L.J. 1604, 1608
(1971).
35. Id. at 1609.
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any given level of return—assuming that the two stocks are not perfectly
correlated (i.e., they do not react exactly the same to changes in the market).
The reason for this is that since the two stocks react differently to market
changes, they effectively hedge the risk of each other. This two-asset example
is extended in portfolio theory to arrive at a very general claim: as an investor
increases her holding of assets in a portfolio, she is able to eliminate virtually
all individual asset risk (unsystematic risk) and is only left with market risk
(systematic risk).36 The upshot of this is that all rational and risk averse
investors (again, a general assumption in corporate finance theory) will hold
diversified portfolios.37
An implication of portfolio theory is that the correct measure of risk is not
the way in which an individual security reacts to market shifts but, rather, its
contribution to the risk of a portfolio. A key move in finance theory is to
assume that all individuals have the same estimates for the expected return,
variance, and covariance of securities.38 (Finance theorists refer to this
assumption as the “homogeneous expectations” theory.39) It is important to
note that it is not necessary that all market actors are rational or indeed have
homogenous expectations.40 Indeed, most corporate finance theorists would
concede that neither assumption is realistic.41 But the basic theories of
corporate finance can be maintained under conditions in which the market acts
“as if” these assumptions were true.42 If this is so, then there is one idealized
optimal portfolio (in terms of mix of risky assets) that all individuals will hold.
Logic would dictate that this optimal portfolio would reflect the market of
risky assets—the market portfolio.43 This is represented in a broad-based
portfolio such as the Standard & Poor’s 500 (“S&P 500”).44 While it is not
possible to hold the S&P 500, there are financial products that are designed to
mimic it. In addition, the fact that mutual funds make up a large part of
investor holdings lends credence to the assumption that the market portfolio is
a suitable proxy for the risky-asset portfolio. If an individual is less or more
risk averse, she will either mix her risky assets (market portfolio) with non-

36. Id. at 1615.
37. Id.
38. ROSS ET AL., supra note 7, at 280.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id; see also William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium
Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425, 433–34 (1964).
42. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 21–22 (U. of Chi. Press
1953).
43. ROSS ET AL., supra note 7, at 280.
44. See, e.g., S&P 500, http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-500/en/us/?indexId=
spusa-500-usduf--p-us-l--.
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risky assets (e.g., Treasury-bills) or borrow (leverage) to acquire more of the
optimal risky asset portfolio.45
It is difficult to overestimate the theoretical and practical significance of
portfolio theory. It is the intellectual basis behind the proliferation of mutual
funds. While investors had always instinctively diversified their asset
holdings, Markowitz laid the foundation for a scientific/mathematical approach
to building efficient portfolios and determining the efficient allocation of assets
given an investor’s risk/return preferences.46 Portfolio analysis is theoretically
simple. Constructing portfolios was computationally difficult, however, until
there were adequate advances in computing skills that allowed investment
managers to engineer efficient portfolios—hence, the explosion in the mutual
fund business. Portfolio theory also served as the basis for core developments
in corporate finance theory to follow.47
The implication that investors will choose to hold a market portfolio was
the central insight that led to the capital asset pricing model.48 The capital
asset pricing model provides a roadmap for calculating the expected returns
(and thence, price) for any individual security.49 It was developed by William
Sharpe in 1964.50 The theory was an extension of Sharpe’s Ph.D dissertation
that had been written under the tutelage of Markowitz.51
It is possible to measure the expected price fluctuation of an individual
security against market portfolio price fluctuations.52 This measurement is
referred to as , or Beta, in finance theory.53 An investor concerned with the
riskiness of an individual security will take Beta as its measure given our
assumption that all investors will choose to hold a market portfolio. Again, the
reason why this is the case is that Beta is a measure of the riskiness of the asset
in relationship to the market (i.e., the investor’s market portfolio to which the
asset will be added).54 Beta is a commonly found statistic.55 One can find the

45. Cohen, supra note 34, at 1609–10
46. See generally MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION, supra note 28.
47. Jeffrey S. Glaser, Comment, The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Risk Valuation, Judicial
Interpretation, and Market Bias, 50 BUS. LAW. 687, 689–70 (1995).
48. See id.
49. Sharpe, supra note 41, at 435–42.
50. Id. at 425.
51. William F. Sharpe, Autobiography, Nobelprize.org, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/
economics/laureates/1990/sharpe-autobio.html.
52. See Peter V. Letsou, Implications of Shareholder Diversification on Corporate Law and
Organization: The Case of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 179, 206 n.74
(2001).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See California State University, Fullerton, Business Students’ FAQs: Company Financial
Information, http://guides.library.fullerton.edu/busifaq/financials.htm.
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Beta of any publicly traded company readily via the Internet.56 There are a few
intuitive steps between understanding Beta and calculating the expected return
for an individual security. At a minimum, given that the security is a risky
asset, an investor will demand that it return something greater than returns for
risk-free assets.57 (This is implied in the risk aversion assumption.) The
measure of that “something greater” is represented in the capital asset pricing
model:
R = Rf +  X(Rm – Rf),

where R is the expected return, Rf is the risk-free rate of returns,  is the
measure of the riskiness of the asset in relationship to the market, and Rm is the
return on the market portfolio.58 The capital asset pricing model incorporates
the assumptions that investors seek an efficient mix of risk and return—
combining insights from portfolio theory and the belief that an individual
investor acting in his or her self-interest drives markets towards efficiency.59
The idea of market efficiency took prominent place in corporate finance
with Eugene Fama’s articulation of the efficient market hypothesis in 1970.60
An efficient market is implicit in the homogeneous expectations assumption
underlying corporate finance theory.61 In order for the efficient market
hypothesis to hold true, individual investors must act rationally.62 This does
not mean that every individual must act rationally but that rationality
predominates to an extent great enough such that pricing reflects rational
decision-making. As discussed previously, the rationality assumption also
survives if the market behaves “as if” rationality prevailed. One mechanism
for this is arbitrage, where savvy investors invest in the market in such a way
as to take advantage of irrational choices and subsequently force assets to
efficient price levels. Another way in which the market can obtain a rational
outcome in the face of irrationality is when irrational actors effectively cancel
each other out. For example, if a similar number of investors both undervalue
and overvalue an asset, the efficient price should theoretically prevail.63

56. Id.
57. Cohen, supra note 34, at 1608.
58. ROSS ET AL., supra note 7 at 285.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 31–40 (discussing rationality assumptions).
60. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. AM. FIN. ASS’N 383 (1970) (setting forth the efficient market theory); see also Gill
North, Efficiency, Fairness & Irrationality: Incompatible or Complementary?, 24 BANKING &
FIN. L. REV. 311, 315 (2009).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 40–48 (discussing the homogeneous expectations
theory).
62. North, supra note 60, at 315.
63. ROSS ET AL., supra note 7, at 354.
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Fama proposed three forms of efficient markets: weak, semi-strong, and
strong.64 The weak version presupposes that all former price information is
reflected in asset pricing.65 The semi-strong definition requires that all public
information (including past prices) be incorporated in pricing.66 The strong
version assumes that all information (public and private) is embedded in
prices.67 At the University of Chicago, (the university home of Savage,
Markowitz, Sharpe, and Fama) researchers devoted a great deal of attention to
conducting studies that would prove the efficient market hypothesis correct.68
These “event studies” were based on analyzing price movements as related to
information disclosure.69 This empirical research seemed to support the
efficient market hypothesis (particularly in its weak and semi-strong forms).70
Corporate finance theorists make limited claims with regard to the three forms
of the efficient market hypothesis; they claim that the theories stand for the
proposition that one cannot gain an advantage in investing in the market
because, depending on the form of the efficient market hypothesis, certain
information is already reflected in prices.71 Regardless, the lore regarding
efficient markets that has filtered into the popular conscience is that assets are
appropriately priced and reflect underlying value.72
The theoretical architecture of modern corporate finance theory fits well
with free market ideology. It hardly comes as a surprise that most of the
preeminent architects of corporate finance either found their institutional home
at the University of Chicago or were heavily influenced by it.73 Corporate
finance was forged in the same University of Chicago crucible that produced
some of our most prominent free market oriented neoclassical economists:
Frank Knight, Milton Friedman, George Stigler, Gary Becker, and James

64. Fama, supra note 60, at 383.
65. Id. at 388.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust
Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 656 (1996); see also Henry Manne, Remarks on the Lewis &
Clark Law School Business Law Forum: Behavioral Analysis of Corporate Law: Instruction or
Distraction?, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 169, 172 (2006).
69. Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons From Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance,
and Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VT. L. REV. 1017, 1026 (1991).
70. Id. at 1028–29.
71. Merritt B. Fox, The Legal Environment of International Finance: Thinking About
Fundamentals, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 721, 724–25 (1996) (reviewing HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A.
WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATIONS (1995)).
72. See William S. Blatt, Minority Discounts, Fair Market Value, and the Culture of Estate
Taxation, 52 TAX L. REV. 225, 227 (1997).
73. See Kenneth G. Elzinga, Law and Economics: Is there a Higher Law?, 36 PEPP. L. REV.
507, 510 (2008) (describing the University of Chicago as the “taproot of the law and economics
movement” and the scholars with roots at the institution).
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Buchanan to name only a select few.74 Four of these economists received the
Nobel Prize for Economic Science, as did Markowitz and Sharpe.75 Fama’s
efficient market hypothesis (and, by extension, the capital asset pricing model)
imply that there is no need for government intervention to adjust prices since
the market is efficient.76 The market and its individual rational actors are, after
all, the best organizers of economic activity. Prices are the market’s signal to
its individual rational actors. F.A. Hayek argued that price serves as the
coordinating device for organizing an economy in an influential article entitled
The Use of Knowledge in Society.77 Hayek was an inspirational figure for
Chicago school economists, and his classic, The Road to Serfdom, serves as a
foundational text for the contemporary conservative movement.78
A critical implication for the belief in market efficiency and the
informational role of prices is that there should not be bubbles (artificially high
prices) in markets. This belief held sway through such tumultuous economic
times as the 1980s real estate boom and collapse that led to the savings and
loan crisis, as well as the boom in the high-tech (“dot-com”) industry in the
1990s.79 Of course, each of these bubbles burst even while the theory of free
markets continued to gain political prestige.80 The confidence in free markets
was even further bolstered in the financial industry because of the scientific
patina placed on it in light of corporate finance theory.81
This belief in the free market—particularly in the finance industry—
contributed to a host of deregulatory moves in the last few decades of the
twentieth century that arguably set the stage for the 2008 financial crisis. The
major deregulatory decision was to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act.82 The GlassSteagall Act, a product of post-Great Depression financial reform, severely
limited the ability of commercial banks to engage in the insurance and
securities business.83 Glass-Steagall was repealed in 1999 with the passage of

74. Id. In fact, Milton Friedman was on Markowitz’s dissertation committee. Cheng-Few
Lee, Markowitz, Miller, and Sharpe: The First Nobel Laureates in Finance, 1 REV.
QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 209, 214 (1991).
75. Lee, supra note 74, at 209.
76. Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, Market Indeterminacy, 28 J. CORP. L. 517, 528 (2003).
77. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 526 (1945).
78. See F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
79. Erik F. Gerding, Laws Against Bubbles: An Experimental-Asset-Market Approach to
Analyzing Financial Regulation, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 977, 979 (2007).
80. See Joseph M. Schwartz, Democracy Against the Free Market: The Enron Crisis and the
Politics of Global Deregulation, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1097, 1098–99 (2003).
81. Id.
82. See Barbara Crutchfield George et al., The Opaque and Under-Regulated Hedge Fund
Industry: Victim or Culprit in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis?, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 359, 365
n.25 (2009).
83. Id. at 386.
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the Gramm-Leach-Bliley bill.84 It is perhaps fitting that the major figure
behind the legislation, then Senator Phil Gramm (R-Texas), was a free market
economist and former professor.85 The impetus for its repeal was a merger by
the then-named Citicorp (now Citigroup) with Travelers Group (an insurance
company).86 The merger violated Glass-Steagall, and it would have been
dissolved if nothing were done to relax regulations.87 In addition to the
prudential concern of having to possibly unwind one of the major mergers in
United States history, which reflected the general expansionary direction of the
financial industry, the belief in free markets had so permeated political
thinking that Glass-Steagall seemed like an unnecessary regulatory artifact of
the New Deal era.88 After all, if markets responded well and seemed to
support the creation of financial companies that acted as “one-stop shops” for
all financial services needs, the popular conception of efficient markets would
imply that this was the proper course. Government intervention to stave off
such financial conglomeration could only produce inefficiencies. GrammLeach-Bliley, signed into law by President Clinton, was part of the general
deregulation ethos that transformed not only the United States but also
countries around the globe.89
Milton Friedman was very much the intellectual nova for this free market
movement.90 He wrote paradigmatic conservative texts such as A Monetary
History of the United States,91 Capitalism and Freedom,92 and Free to
Choose,93 as well as doing technical economics. All the while, the economics
department, business school, and law school at the University of Chicago were
continuing to produce and promote an ever growing number of academic stars
in the fields of economics and finance whose technical acumen was matched,

84. Id. at 385–86.
85. See United States Congress, Biographical Directory of the United States Congress,
Gramm, William Philip (Phil) Biographical Information, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/bio
display.pl?index=g000365.
86. Robert W. Dixon, Note, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act: Why
Reform in the Financial Services Industry Was Necessary and the Act’s Projected Effects on
Community Banking, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 671, 676 (2001).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. George et al., supra note 82, at 387. See also DANIEL YERGIN, THE COMMANDING
HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE THAT IS REMAKING
THE MODERN WORLD (1998).
90. Patricia Sullivan & Carlos Lozado, Economist Touted Laissez-Faire Policy, WASH.
POST, Nov. 17, 2006, at A01.
91. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 1867–1960 (1963).
92. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
93. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT
(1980).
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often times, by their political conservatism.94 The second wave of finance
theorists would take corporate finance to new technical heights and penetrate
the core of Wall Street.
The genesis of this technical development goes back to the initial question
raised by Markowitz: How do we deal with risk under conditions of
uncertainty? But the next generation would take the question a step further:
How do we master risk? The answer would lie in options. In their most basic
form, options (also known as derivatives) come in two types: calls and puts.95
A call gives the holder a right to buy an asset at a designated price for a
contractually agreed upon period of time.96 A put grants the holder the right to
sell an asset for an agreed upon price during a specified time frame.97
Derivatives such as put and call options can be sliced, diced, and configured in
endless ways to create particular risk characteristics.98 They provide investors
with a vehicle to precisely manage risks. A key breakthrough in finance theory
was the derivation of a formula for valuing options—the famous BlackScholes model, which was put forward by Fischer Black and Myron Scholes in
1973.99 Black-Scholes expands upon the foundation of the capital asset pricing
model. Like portfolio theory, Black-Scholes had the benefit of having
practical applications.
From the Black-Scholes “simple” equation for valuing standard options,
the field now referred to as “financial engineering” would develop, in which all
manner of securities are created to manage and structure risk.100 Financial
engineers (also referred to as “quants”) are scientists (mathematicians,
physicists, computer scientists, etc.) who are recruited to Wall Street to create

94. See Elzinga, supra note 73, at 511 (discussing University of Chicago-produced
economists’ influence on law and economics); M. Todd Henderson, The Influence of F.A. Hayek
on Law: An Empirical Analysis, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 249, 264 (2005) (discussing the
influence of several Nobel Prize winning economists of the “Chicago School”); Sanford M.
Jacoby, Economic Ideas and the Labor Market: Origins of the Anglo-American Model and
Prospects for Global Diffusion, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 43, 49 (2003) (describing the
University of Chicago as “the center of neoclassical conservatism”).
95. Michael Parkinson, Option Pricing: The American Put, 50 J. BUS. 21, 24 (1977).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Peter H. Huang & Michael S. Knoll, Corporate Finance, Corporate Law and Finance
Theory, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 175, 184–85 (2000).
99. Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J.
POL. ECON. 637, 640–45 (1973). Black and Scholes have both received the Financial Engineer of
the Year award from the International Association of Financial Engineers. Press Release, Richard
Roll Selected as the Recipient of the 2009 IAFE/Sunguard Financial Engineer of the Year Award,
PR NEWSWIRE (Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/richard-roll-selectedas-the-recipient-of-the-2009-iafesungard-financial-engineer-of-the-year-award-79410062.html
(listing previous winners).
100. Huang & Knoll, supra note 98, at 184–85.
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exotic financial instruments.101 It is a highly technical enterprise utilizing very
abstract mathematical concepts. These engineers create instruments ranging
from synthetic options to other complex derivatives.
A legendary example of the application (and pitfalls) of option-hedging
strategies is Long Term Capital Management (LTCM).102 Two of the titans of
corporate finance theory, Myron Scholes and Robert Merton were among the
leading lights of LTCM.103 LTCM’s founder, John Meriwether, was a
trendsetter in recruiting and training scientists to become financial
engineers.104 With the advent of exponentially more powerful computing,
financial arbitrage would become the province of science.105 LTCM utilized a
financial device referred to as portfolio insurance to hedge market risks, made
bets based on financial models that predicted when certain assets in the market
were mispriced, and generally created complicated derivatives as a product for
customers wishing to manage risks.106 Unfortunately, the firm was highly
leveraged and the equations utilized in its models did not adequately account
for a dramatic downturn in the credit markets in 1998.107 This led to the
collapse of the firm.108 Only intervention by the Federal Reserve, led by
chairman Alan Greenspan, staved off widespread financial calamity in the
wake of LTCM’s downfall.109 Of course, this may sound familiar given our
current crisis.
LTCM was only a sneak preview of what was to come regarding the
explosion of complex securities created through financial engineering. With
regard to understanding the financial crisis of 2008, the instruments at the core
of the crisis were collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and credit default
swaps (CDSs).110 Collateralized default obligations are large pools of risky
assets that are packaged together and sold to investors (frequently in slices

101. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 10–12 (2000). These scientists are frequently recruited from our most
prestigious scientific institutions such as MIT and Harvard. Id.
102. Leah Nathans Spiro, Dream Team, BUS. WK., Aug. 29, 1994, at 52.
103. Id. at 50. In fact, Robert Merton was another recipient of the Financial Engineer of the
Year award. Press Release, supra note 99.
104. Spiro, supra note 102, at 54.
105. Id.
106. Id.; see generally LOWENSTEIN, supra note 101 (detailing the demise of LTCM); Darren
Pain & Jonathan Rand, Recent Developments in Portfolio Insurance, 48 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 37,
37–46 (2008) (discussing portfolio insurance concepts).
107. Anthony Bianco, Outsmarting the Market, BUS. WK., Jan. 22, 2007, at 61.
108. Id.
109. Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term Capital
Management, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 189, 201–02 (1999).
110. Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J.
253, 262 (2009).
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with designated risk characteristics).111 As the real estate boom of the late
1990s skyrocketed to incredible heights into the new millennium, real estate
assets (particularly residential real estate) became one of the biggest markets
for CDOs.112 The essential logic, following Markowitz’s insight regarding
portfolio diversification, was that since these bundles of assets derived from
numerous sources, such as home buyers who had taken out mortgages,
diversification would hedge against risk. Moreover, sophisticated investors
could purchase CDSs that acted as a form of insurance against the CDOs either
to hedge their own stake in mortgage backed CDOs, or to hedge against the
prospect that the real estate market would collapse.
The seller of the CDS would promise a payout if the CDO value dipped
below a certain level.113 Trillions of dollars were tied up in this market.114
Implicit in this idea was a belief that the real estate market would not collapse
and, even if it did, CDOs were diversified assets and thus not overly risky
bets.115 Unfortunately, this logic (bringing back memories of LTCM) failed to
take into account a central lesson of portfolio theory: systematic risk cannot be
diversified away.116 Just as the market LTCM created collapsed once the
credit markets improbably failed, the CDO/CDS market plummeted.117 Once
real estate prices began to adjust to their “correct” levels, home buyers who
had over-leveraged themselves with the assistance of unsound lending
practices could no longer maintain the refinancing cycle that had kept the
housing bubble afloat.118 The CDO/CDS market became so large because not
only could investors hedge their bets on CDOs by purchasing CDSs, but
because they could also buy CDSs without owning CDOs.119 Similar to a put
option, investors effectively shorted the real estate market by betting that it
would lose value.
This activity elevated the risk to all investors, including financial
institutions. In the collapse of 2008, this risk was not limited to hedge funds
111. James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical Assessment of
the ‘New Financial Architecture,’ 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 563, 566 (2009).
112. Id. at 567.
113. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 947–48
(2009). American Insurance Group (“AIG”) was a prominent example of CDS sellers. Id.
114. Crotty, supra note 111, at 569.
115. Felix Salmon, Recipe for Disaster: The Formula that Killed Wall Street, WIRED, Mar.
2009, at 77, 112.
116. Roger W. Reinsch et al., Trust Your Broker?: Suitability, Modern Portfolio Theory, and
Expert Witnesses, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 173, 178 (2004).
117. See Bianco, supra note 107, at 61; Crotty, supra note 111, at 570, 573.
118. Hannah Fairfield, In the Shadow of Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, at BU4; see
also JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARV. U., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2
(2008).
119. Richard D. Cudahy, The Coming Demise of Deregulation II, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 543,
550 (2009).
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like LTCM.120 The risk spread to our most staid financial institutions—
banks.121 In particular, some of our major banks such as Citibank and Bank of
America were tied up in the CDO/CDS market.122 The deregulatory push that
opened the way for banks to engage in risky securities activities through
various sorts of relationships—ultimately culminating in the repeal of GlassSteagall—set the stage for the current crisis by allowing financial institutions
to expand their size and scope of risk.123 The lack of supervision over
derivatives124 fueled the options frenzy in particular. In 2000, the U.S.
Congress, led by Senator Phil Gramm, passed the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act,125 which President Clinton signed into law.126 As a result,
CDSs and other derivatives were unregulated and allowed to proliferate. This
further fueled the housing bubble.127 Again, the pervasive free market ethos
and popular belief in an efficient market supported deregulation, and it allowed
banks and other large institutions to assume more risk than ever before.
The existence of asset bubbles directly contradicts the finance theory
assembled out of the University of Chicago. Bubbles only occur when asset
prices are artificially high and then pop when forces reveal that they have been
overpriced.128 According to the efficient market ideology, this should not
occur outside of extremely improbable events. Nonetheless, Fama actually
documented the fact that, historically, there have been stock swings that are
wildly disproportionate to expected events.129 While stocks prices exhibit the
classic bell-shaped curve, they are not normally distributed and have “long
tails,” which represent greater than expected odds of large upswings and
downswings.130 In fact, Fama found that stock fluctuations expected to occur
once every 7000 years actually occurred once every three to four years.131

120. Kenneth C. Johnston et al., The Subprime Morass: Past, Present and Future, 12 N.C.
BANKING INST. 125, 129–30 (2008).
121. Id. at 130.
122. Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis,
13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 83 (2009).
123. Crutchfield George et al., supra note 82, at 387.
124. Moran, supra note 122, at 42.
125. Commodities Futures Modernizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b-1 (2006).
126. Eric Lipton, Gramm and the ‘Enron Loophole,’ N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/17/business/17grammside.html.
127. See Moran, supra note 122, at 33 (noting that in order to fuel the market for securitized
assets, banks increasingly cared less about the credit worthiness of the homebuyer and more about
their ability to acquire new mortgages and bundle them into securities).
128. Eugene F. Fama, Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34, 38 (1965).
129. Id. at 36.
130. Id. at 49.
131. Id. at 50.
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These observations reportedly led Fama to be circumspect about his former
student Myron Scholes’ endeavors with LTCM.132
Of course, historically, asset bubbles, like the 1929 stock crash and
subsequent depression, have wreaked havoc on financial markets.133
University of Chicago adherents credited the failure of government monetary
policy for the Great Depression, among other macroeconomic ills. Friedman
discussed this and other monetary policy matters in A Monetary History of the
United States.134 The Federal Reserve primarily used monetary policy to
manage the economic fallout of bubbles.135 Greenspan, a free market adherent,
was loath to place the blame for asset bubbles on markets.136 Government did
not need to directly regulate economic activity.137 The Federal Reserve could
ease the crunch caused by bubble phenomenon by pumping money into the
economy and making sure that the economic carnage was localized. This
strategy limited the 1990s dot-com disaster and the fallout from the collapse of
Monetary policy is the favored conservative recipe for
LTCM.138
macroeconomic policy because it does not require an expansion of government
programs.139 In assessing the causes of the most recent financial crisis, Phil
Gramm, now vice chairman of UBS Investment Bank, has argued that its
origins can be found in loose monetary policy and government intervention in
the housing market.140

132. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 101, at 71–72.
133. NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD
160–61 (2008).
134. Id. at 300.
135. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates
and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 1005 (2009) (explaining
the Federal Rerserve Bank’s response to various bubbles under Greenspan).
136. See Alan Greenspan, FRB Chairman, Testimony before the House Comm. on Fin.
Servs., Jul. 18, 2001, reprinted in 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 588, 592 (“Too often people are prone to
recurring bouts of optimism and pessimism that manifest themselves from time to time in the
buildup or cessation of speculative excesses.”).
137. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 135, at 1005–06 (describing that, under Greenspan, the
Federal Reserve policy in 2002 was to lower interest rates so people could refinance and use the
money to stimulate the economy, as opposed to directly intervening).
138. Id. at 1005.
139. See H. Laurence Miller, Jr., On the “Chicago School of Economics,” 70 J. POL. ECON.
64, 65–66 (1962) (noting that the Chicago school, including Friedman, is attributed for advocating
limited government and for disfavoring government intervention such as “occupational
limitations, price controls, and public transfers in kind such as public housing as a matter of
course”); see also Edward Nelson, Milton Friedman and U.S. Monetary History: 1961–2006, 89
FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 153, 154, 161 (2007) (describing how Friedman agreed with the
Eisenhower Administration’s decision to not aggressively stimulate the aggregate demand to fight
inflation and Friedman’s general disdain for spending during an inflationary period).
140. Phil Gramm, Editorial, Deregulation and the Financial Panic: Loose Money and
Politicized Mortgages Are the Real Villains, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2009, at A17. Examples of
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The widespread impact on financial institutions, particularly banks,
rendered the Federal Reserve ineffective in the face of the disaster. No matter
how much money the Federal Reserve pumped into the economy or how
cheaply it made money available, financial firms did not trust each other
enough to lend to one another (or others), and the wheels of credit creation
ground to a halt.141 Firms failed to trust one another because the CDO/CDS
market had become so pervasive that it impacted a significant portion of major
financial institutions.142 Everyone was at risk. This problem was compounded
by the impossibility of determining how much risk any individual institution
carried, since the underlying risky assets (the CDOs and CDSs) are so
complex.143 Financial engineers had created instruments that were so
complicated that no one, even the creators of the products, could appropriately
value them. We had a bubble, but we could not truly appreciate its size and
consequence. Rationality and the worship of science had hit the wall in
finance.
One group of corporate finance theorists did pay particular attention to
bubbles and did not view them as mirages.144 Behavioral economics
challenges the basic tenet of corporate finance theory—market rationality.145
The claim of behavioralists is not that we are all irrational but that market
players may have biases sufficient to undermine the rationality assumption,
undermining the efficient market hypothesis in corporate finance.146 We need
look no further to find irrational behavior than to the pastime of casino
gambling. It is obviously not an even money proposition—it is by definition
irrational—because casinos would not make a profit otherwise. Yet, it is a
thriving business along with state lotteries, which is, of course, another losing
proposition for players. Moreover, deviations from rationality are not
necessarily random and thus do not necessarily cancel one another out.147
Behavioralists point to certain deviations from rationality that may be
government intervention include lending benchmarks for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and
Community Reinvestment Act requirements that financial institutions make best efforts to lend to
under-served communities. See id.
141. See Moran, supra note 122, at 71–76 (describing the closing of various credit channels
and the federal response).
142. Id. at 71.
143. Id. at 40.
144. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, at xviii–xix (2d ed. 2005)
[hereinafter SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE].
145. ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL
FINANCE 23–24 (2000).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 12 (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristic and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974)); Robert J. Shiller, Stock Prices and Social
Dynamics, 2 Brookings Papers Econ. Activity 457–98 (1984), reprinted in MARKET VOLATILITY
7, 41 (3d ed. 1991).
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systemic.148 Investors may routinely draw conclusions from insufficient data
because the bias of “representativeness” leads them to believe that the last
outcome is necessarily representative of the next.149 The flip side of this is that
individuals may be too conservative to adjust to changed conditions.150 Both
of these phenomena (representativeness and conservatism) can lead to
bubbles.151
The phenomenon of bubbles is a chief piece of evidence in the
behaviorists’ critique of mainstream corporate finance theory.152 In 1981,
Robert Shiller, a leading behavioral economist, wrote an influential article for
the American Economics Review entitled “Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to
Be Justified by Subsequent Changes to Dividends?”153 It was a direct assault
on the efficient market hypothesis.154 The article was based on an analysis of
swings in the U.S. stock market since the 1920s in an effort to determine
whether such swings could be explained by expected future dividends.155 The
answer was no, undercutting the efficient market hypothesis that information is
accurately reflected in prices.156 The stock market crash of 1987—yet another
bubble—lent further credence to the growing dissent of behavioralists.157 In
2000, Shiller wrote his bestselling book Irrational Exuberance, arguing that
the stock market, which had been experiencing historic highs at the time, was
actually overpriced, and the bubble was due to pop.158 The market began a
rapid descent shortly thereafter.159 Shiller based his prediction on a chart that
showed average stock prices relative to earnings since the nineteenth
century.160 Inordinately high peaks on the chart corresponded negatively with
future stock prices.161 Shiller made similar predictions regarding the most

148. See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 147, at 1131.
149. Id. at 1124–27.
150. Ward Edwards, Conservatism in Human Information Processing, in FORMAL
REPRESENTATION OF HUMAN JUDGMENT 17, 17–18 (Benjamin Kleinmuntz ed., 1968).
151. See SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 144, at 152–55, 256 (noting that
representativeness and conservativism can lead to overconfidence which, in turn, can lead to
bubbles).
152. See, e.g., Robert J. Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to Be Justified by
Subsequent Changes in Dividends?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 421, 422 (1981) [hereinafter Shiller,
Stock Prices Move]; SHLEIFER, supra note 145, at 154–78.
153. Shiller, Stock Prices Move, supra note 152, at 421.
154. See SHLEIFER, supra note 145, at 16–17 (describing the article and its import); Shiller,
Stock Prices Move, supra note 152, at 421–22.
155. Shiller, Stock Prices Move, supra note 152, at 421–22.
156. Id. at 421, 433–34.
157. See SHLEIFER, supra note 145, at 20.
158. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 144, at 203–09.
159. Id. at xii.
160. Id. at 6 fig. 1.1.
161. See id.
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recent financial crisis based on historical charts that chronicled real estate
prices.162 Shiller argued that the real estate market was overinflated.163
Shiller’s brand of empiricism based on historical trends is precisely the type of
inductivism scorned by Leonard Savage.
The methodological approach of behavioralists has some resonance with
Professor powell’s description of post-Enlightenment ideas. Powell argues
that advances in science—in particular, the fundamental insight of quantum
theory that phenomena at the quantum level are observer dependent—compel
us to have a more perspectivist view and avoid the pitfall of single viewpoint
analysis.164 This view is reflected in the behavioralists’ belief that we have to
have a broader conception of human psychology than the rational actor
assumption that drives the Chicago school of finance theory and the tendency
of behavioralists to take history seriously.165 Professor powell highlights the
point of perspectivism in drawing a connection between the postEnlightenment era and the concept of implicit bias in the field of mind
science.166 He references Marvin Minsky’s argument for recognition of the
complexity of the mind as opposed to engaging in Enlightenment
reductionism.167 Recognition of complexity in mind sciences reveals biases
similar to those discussed by behavioral corporate finance theorists.168
In a sense, the financial collapse of 2008 (the most severe fallout from an
asset bubble since the stock market crash of 1929, which led to the Great
Depression) opens up space for looking beyond the Enlightenment beliefs that
serve as the foundation for modern finance theory. This is evident in the
increased attention to behavioral economics.169 It is also manifest in the steady
stream of historically-oriented popular books chronicling the current collapse

162. See id. at 11–27 (suggesting that, based on historical information on home prices in the
United States and in certain sample cities, the psychological factors of participants in the housing
market lead to volatility and that high home prices in certain cities may decrease and eventually
fall over a course of years).
163. See SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 144, at 11–27 (analyzing U.S.
home prices relative to building costs, population, and interest rates, and home prices in sample
cities, and suggesting that the price increase of homes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of
the 2000s was the result of psychological factors among market participants rather than rational
economic forces).
164. powell & Menendian, supra note 1, at 1064–67.
165. Shiller explicitly incorporates “economics, psychology, demography, sociology and
history” in his analysis, as well as traditional and behavioral finance. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL
EXUBERANCE, supra note 144, at xviii.
166. powell & Menendian, supra note 1, at 1064–67.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 144, at 58 (discussing the role
the “wishful thinking bias” played in the housing bubble).
169. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008) (advocating use of
behavioral economics in a variety of policy areas).
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as well as past financial calamities.170 The story of the rise of behavioral
economics also points to the resilience of Enlightenment ideals, however. The
very scientific ethos that inspired Markowitz and those who followed him in
developing modern finance theory also motivates behavioral finance
theorists.171 While Chicago-school corporate finance theorists count Nobel
Prize winners among their membership, so do behavioralists—namely Daniel
Kahneman, who led the way in integrating cognitive psychology insights into
neoclassical economic theory.172 As Kahneman’s work on prospect theory
(evaluating biases under different scenarios) illustrates, behavioral economists
and finance theorists are dealing with the same issue that first motivated
Markowitz and has propelled finance theory—how do we make decisions
under the cloud of uncertainty?173 Behavioralists take a broader view of
knowledge acquisition and how to approach this fundamental question.174 In
broadening our lens, we should not lose sight of the fact that we owe a great
debt to the Enlightenment ethos that places such a heavy emphasis on the
acquisition of knowledge. It is an Enlightenment inheritance that we should
continue to appreciate and cherish—while remaining vigilant with regard to its
limitations. It may very well be the key to propelling us forward in the postEnlightenment era.

170. See, e.g., FERGUSON, supra note 133.
171. Markowitz has come to recognize that the rational actor model may need tweaking and
the consideration of behavioral economics. Markowitz Interview, supra note 10.
I think it is perfectly reasonable for people to ask what about the real behavior of investors
as distinguished from rational behavior. I do not necessarily subscribe to each article by
the behavioral economists, but I think it is a reasonable activity to pursue. I am especially
interested in simulations that involve asynchronous time, which means that time does not
go by steady increments necessarily and need not be continuous, but can advance to the
most imminent event of various kinds. If you make assumptions about how people in the
market behave, and put those assumptions inside the simulation, you can see whether
behavioral theories at the micro level add up to observable market behavior.
Id.
172. See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 147, at 263 (critiquing expected utility
theory and proposing a new model of decisionmaking under risk, based primarily on observations
of certain widespread tendencies in human judgment).
173. See, e.g., id.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 151–56.
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